As my readers know, I have never written a book about the Peninsular War nor the 100 Days. Rather, I have left those topics to British writers because their proximity to primary sources and to the battlefields themselves allows them to do a better job. But last year’s visit to Waterloo, for a third time over three decades, a review I wrote for The Journal of Military History, of Wargaming Waterloo by Charles Esdaile, and an unexpected offer from The Sound of the Drums, prompted me to write a new book. The Battle of Quatre Bras, 1815, is the inaugural volume in the Sound of History book series. The book will be available as a paperback and e-book later this fall. Here are some excerpts, combined with some of my ‘semi-random’ thoughts.
First recall Napoleon’s words:
“Tactics can be learned from treatises…and so can the various military evolutions or the science of the engineer and the gunner; but knowledge of the grand principles of warfare can be acquired only through the study of military history and of the battles of the great captains and through experience. There are no precise, determinate rules: everything depends on the character that nature has bestowed on the general, on his qualities and defects, on the nature of the troops, on the range of the weapons, on the season of the year, and on a thousand circumstances which are never twice the same.”
At 10 a.m. on June 16, 1815, the Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras. He complimented the Prince of Orange and Lieutenant General Perponcher for their decision to concentrate their forces at the crossroads. Looking around, he initially concluded that, “Only a small body of Belgian troops, two or three battalions of infantry…and two or three cannon” were present. No general surpassed Wellington’s ability to see and assess accurately a battlefield’s tactical features. His misapprehension underlines how Quatre Bras’s subtle elevation shifts and tall standing crops, many over six feet tall, interfered with lines of sight. In fact, at this time 6,500 soldiers defended the crossroads. There were nine infantry battalions and two batteries with sixteen guns.
Marshal Ney began his advance from Frasnes toward Quatre Bras at 2 p.m. He had two infantry divisions commanded by Lieutenant General Bachelu and Lieutenant General Foy with a combined total of 10,000 men including Major General Baron Hippolyte de Piré’s 2,000 cavalry, and 30 guns. To reach the crossroads, the infantry had to move around the edge of the Delhutte Wood. North of the woods was high ground. The French could see mounted enemy officers observing their advance from this high ground. In past battles, Wellington had concealed his main line of defense by occupying the high ground’s back side (in military language ‘the reverse slope’). The commander of Ney’s II Corps, Lieutenant General Reille, remembered the Duke’s reverse slope tactic and advised Ney to proceed cautiously: “It will be perhaps like our battles in Spain and the English will only show themselves when the time comes.”
Ney’s tactical plan was for the 2nd Légère, a powerful, 2,200-man regiment with four battalions, to capture Piraumont and then threaten the road to Namur. The rest of Bachelu’s division, supported by artillery and cavalry, would thrust to the crossroads. Ney had planned a combined arms assault featuring all three arms.
The advancing 2nd Légère employed a particularly strong skirmish line to shield their columns. In addition to the voltigeur companies (one-sixth of each battalion) at least one, and perhaps two whole battalions also deployed as skirmishers.
As soon as the French columns advanced, the front widened to allow more French batteries to join the gun line. Two batteries opened fire on Captain Bijleveld’s Dutch horse guns. Only 650 yards separated the antagonists. At this range experienced gunners could hardly miss. The French 6lb balls quickly killed numerous horses. Dutch gunners frantically cut their traces to free the limbers from the dead weight. Panicked horses lashed out with their hooves in an effort to escape. Bijleveld reluctantly ordered his guns to limber and withdraw to high ground 875 yards to the north before the barrage destroyed his entire battery. After driving off the horse guns, French artillery switched to Captain Stevenaar’s six guns. Again their fire proved overwhelming by killing horses, destroying ammunition wagons, and disabling two guns.
Stevenaar ordered the two damaged guns to be driven back through Quatre Bras where he hoped they could be repaired. Suddenly, the Prince of Orange appeared. He recognized that to remain here was futile and ordered Stevenaar to join Bijlevled. Without artillery support, the Dutch 27th Jägers also retreated. The new Dutch-Belgian artillery position quickly proved untenable. French artillery pounded the position. Amidst falling men and horses, a limber exploded rendering the piece immobile. A solid shot killed Stevenaar.
The Dutch gunners’ experience contrasted with the typical British experience in the Peninsula. Effective French skirmishers and artillery fire seldom occurred against the British in the Peninsula because of a dominant British and British-allied skirmish line that prevented French artillery from coming so close. Here the French had the dominant skirmish line so their guns could achieve favorable firing positions.
General Piré, or one of his colonels, thought he saw opportunity. The enemy line was clearly overextended and seemed unsteady. Cavalry officers made their reputation by making split-second decisions. So it was that a regiment of light horse charged the 5th National Militia Battalion. In turn, the Netherlands battalion (whose colonel had been an officer of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard Pupilles and understood how to lead young soldiers into battle) formed square and repelled the charge.
Until allied reinforcements arrived, the French enjoyed a numerical advantage. Ney had about 20,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 38 guns. They faced Perponcher’s 8,000 tired infantry, no cavalry, and 11 remaining guns. For the first time this day, the Marshal ordered an advance using most of his available forces. Skirmishers spearheaded the infantry columns as they moved across the Gémioncourt stream. Piré’s horsemen followed with the artillery providing support. On the right the 2nd Légère crossed the Namur Road to sever Wellington’s connection with the Prussians. On the left Jérôme’s fresh division advanced toward the Bossu Wood. All of these French efforts were successful.
The allied artillery withdrew to a position only 200 yards south of Quatre Bras. The weakened allied infantry followed. General Piré again sensed opportunity and ordered his chasseurs à cheval to charge. A Dutch lieutenant wrote, “The yielding skirmish line hurried in confusion…hoping to find cover. Before it could be reached, they were overrun by the cavalry; many were sabered and found their deaths beneath the hooves of the horses.” The survivors ran in panic back to Quatre Bras.
The Prince of Orange saw impending disaster. If the panic spread, all was lost. He sent orders to Major General van Merlen to charge the French cavalry. Merlen’s troopers had dismounted around Quatre Bras in order to relieve their horses who had been saddled for nine hours. Tired and thirsty—it was a hot, humid day—the horses were far from fresh. Without time to scout or to form in an orderly way, the 6th (North Netherlands) Hussars, 600-men strong, dutifully advanced and charged.
It proved no contest. During the initial moments of the melee, the veteran French troopers killed fourteen hussars and wounded another thirty-eight. Indicative of the nature of cavalry combat was the experience of 26-year-old Louis Dahout. A second lieutenant in the 6th Chasseurs à cheval, Dahout endured a saber wound to the head, a shot in the right arm, and three other saber wounds to the same arm.
The shattered Dutch hussars broke in disorder. The pursuing French regrouped, and then charged Stevenaar’s battery, which had limbered and moved forward to support Merlen’s brigade. The Dutch gunners tried to defend themselves with their short swords, rammers, and trail spikes. It was hopeless. The French captured the battery.
Having broken the enemy cavalry, Piré sent his two lancer regiments in pursuit. The lancers had an easy time picking off the fleeing Dutch infantry, as well as fallen wounded and dismounted horsemen. Their victims had little chance against lances wielded by horsemen. Meanwhile, one of the two elite chasseurs à cheval companies spotted a group of enemy officers. Sensing more easy prey, they charged, They did not know that their prey was the Prince of Orange and his staff. Mounted on superb horses, the Dutch officers escaped and found shelter inside an infantry square.
At the crossroads, perhaps on the Duke of Brunswick’s order or maybe at Wellington’s command, the Brunswick cavalry charged down the Charleroi Road. The Duke of Brunswick led his Uhlan Squadron into the battle. At first, the cavalry checked the advance of the French infantry. But then the French formed battalion squares. Their steady musketry forced the Uhlans to retire. Piré’s chasseurs à cheval returned to the battle and charged the Uhlans. Two Brunswick infantry battalions standing in square interfered and drove back the French horsemen. These Brunswickers belonged to the 1st Line Battalion and the Leib-Battalion. They were young and inexperienced soldiers. Suddenly, the skirmishers of the Avantgarde-Battalion, recruited from professional gamekeepers and foresters but also untested in battle, ran back to the squares to warn that the French infantry were approaching! Foy’s men had come again.
They conducted a model combined-arms attack. Supported by numerous skirmishers, the leading infantry battalion stood in line to fire at the squares. Behind it marched the infantry columns and a horse battery. Poised on the flanks were cavalry whose presence compelled the Brunswickers to stay in square. The French horse guns pounded them with 6lb balls while the musketry inflicted serious losses. They attempted to withdraw in square until overcome with fear. Then they broke in panic and ran back toward the crossroads. The Duke of Brunswick tried to rally them. A musket ball struck his right wrist and continued just above his hip punching through his abdomen, liver, and lung before exiting the left side of his chest. Devoted soldiers carried the mortally wounded Duke to the rear. In the words of Mike Robinson, so passed “a son whose father had also paid the ultimate price in challenging French imperial ambitions.” (Karl, the Duke of Brunswick received a mortal wound at the battle of Auerstädt in 1806.)
The Brunswick Hussars charged in an effort to stop the French advance. Struck in front and flank by artillery and musket fire, their effort collapsed and they too fled back to the crossroads. This left the recently arrived British infantry east of the Charleroi Road exposed, or in military language, with their flank ‘dangling in the air.’ Piré’s two lancer regiments wheeled to their right and accelerated toward the infantry.
The 6th Lancers charged the 1/42nd (Highland) Regiment of Foot. Corporal Alexander McEween told his commanding officer “Those are French Lancers.” The colonel replied, “No, they belong to the Prince of Orange!” Then, the “skirmishers ran in with the cry Square, Square, French Cavalry! The Lancers overtook two Companies in the act of completing the Square. Several of the 42nd were cut off, but a portion of the Lancers became hemmed inside the Square by the remainder of those two Companies, and were instantly bayoneted.”
McEween’s account is gripping but incomplete. The lancers rode down the regiment’s light company (one of the “two companies” the sergeant refers to) and then braved the disjointed Highland musket fire to close to contact. Very quickly their lances struck down Lieutenant Colonel Robert Macara and the two officers who replaced him. Four Highland soldiers wrapped Macara in a blanket and carried him toward Quatre Bras. They did not get far. Lancers rode them down and killed all four. Then, spotting the defenseless Macara’s golden epaulettes and the star of a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, a lancer drove his point through Macara’s chin and into his brain. Before being driven off, the 6th Lancers killed or wounded 284 out of 613 highlanders present.
Lieutenant Colonel George O’Malley and his brigade commander, Major General Sir Dennis Pack, were riding behind the 2/44th (East Essex) Regiment of Foot. Lieutenant Colonel O’Malley saw a body of cavalry moving quickly toward the crossroads. He clearly made out the black uniforms trimmed in light blue of the Brunswick Hussars. He also saw that other horsemen were amongst them. Friend or foe? Some thought they were Brunswick Uhlans, others that they were Dutch-Belgian cavalry. The old soldiers of the East Essex grenadier company occupied the post of honor on the regiment’s right flank. (In ancient times the most reliable soldiers stood on a unit’s right. It was the most dangerous position since they held their weapon in their right hand and shield in their left. Hence, they had no shield protection against enemy thrusts into their torso. Subsequently, in European armies, when a unit deployed in line its grenadiers continued this tradition by standing on the right flank.) The grenadiers had no doubt and opened fire on the French lancers. Major General Pack, who shared the belief that the riders were friendly, was furious and ordered a cease fire. No sooner had this order been executed than the French were on them.
Lieutenant Colonel John Hamerton realized that the East Essex did not have time to form square. He bellowed “Rear rank, right about face! Present! Fire!” In a remarkable display of nerve, the rear rank obeyed and discharged their muskets. Their accurate fire practically erased the entire first line of the 5th Lancers. But the lancers were not done: “One of these grey-headed devils dashed through our centre, sending his lance in at the left eye of the Senior Ensign, James Christie, [Christie was with the regiment’s color party and assigned to defend the King’s Color] down through his face until it went through his tongue and under the jaw.” Christie’s blood soaked the lance’s red and white pennant. The ensign fell heavily atop the King’s Color. The weight of his fall pulled the lance from the Frenchman’s hand. The East Essex lost 16 officers and about 200 men killed or wounded in this action, nearly half of the soldiers who entered the battle.
The calculus of battle was shifting against the French and Marshal Ney knew it. He could see his foe receiving a steady stream of reinforcements. Worse, around this time he learned that his I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Drouet d’Erlon, was marching toward Ligny to participate in Napoleon’s battle against the Prussians. The marshal resolved to play his last card, the ‘men of iron’, the cuirassiers. He wanted the cuirassiers to charge through the allied army and secure Quatre Bras!
Lieutenant General Kellerman, Count Valmy, was an experienced, talented cavalry leader. He conducted the charge at the Battle of Marengo in 1800 that secured Napoleon’s rise to the head of the French government. Thereafter, he performed many fine feats while displaying a rapacious eye for plunder, After listening to Kellerman’s unconvincing excuses for stealing, Napoleon replied, “General, whenever your name is brought before me, I think of nothing but Marengo.” Now, at Quatre Bras, Kellerman protested that he did not have sufficient strength to accomplish such a mission. Ney ordered him to proceed.
Only one of his two cuirassier brigades was present. Maréchal d’Empire Baron Marie Guiton’s brigade had two understrength regiments. The 11th Cuirassiers numbered a mere 325 troopers. The 8th Cuirassiers had 452. Kellerman rode to the front of the brigade and led them west of the main road toward Quatre Bras. Against all odds, Kellerman’s ‘Men of Iron’ performed wonders. Theirs was the most successful French cavalry charge of the entire Waterloo campaign. From start to end his charge probably lasted no more than twenty minutes. But what a twenty minutes, featuring 800 cuirassiers versus an entire army. His men of iron overran the 2/69th Regiment of Foot seizing one of the East Essex’s colors. They disordered several nearby British regiments, overran a battery, and advanced all the way to the crossroads. Confronting overwhelming strength, they had no choice but to retire.
The Battle of Quatre Bras was not over. But henceforth the French had little chance to win.
